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TIM DONALDSON

Is Begging Communicative Activity Protected by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether begging is protected by the
First Amendment. A majority of lower courts have favorably compared
begging to organized charitable solicitation, which the Supreme Court has
held is protected. Those lower courts have accordingly held that begging is
also constitutionally protected. A minority of lower courts believe that
begging is more akin to conduct than speech and therefore falls outside the
ambit of the Free Speech Clause.
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s charitable solicitation cases
and speech versus conduct cases to reach the conclusion that begging should
be considered speech. This Article asserts that the disagreement among lower
courts relates more to what level of constitutional protection should be
extended than how the disagreement impacts the threshold question of
whether begging implicates the Free Speech Clause. This Article concludes
that begging should be afforded full constitutional protection when a court
determines it is characteristically intertwined with core value speech.
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ARTICLE
IS BEGGING COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY PROTECTED
BY THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Tim Donaldson†
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court held in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment that “charitable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door,
involve a variety of speech interests—communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes—that are within the protection of the First Amendment.”1 The Court
has not directly addressed whether panhandling (i.e., begging) is
constitutionally protected speech.2 However, a vast majority of lower courts
have held that begging is a type of charitable solicitation protected by the First
Amendment.3 A minority have held that panhandling is more akin to
unprotected conduct than speech.4 As a California appeals court explained in
People v. Zimmerman: “The mere fact that the proscribed act may be
accomplished by speech does not in and of itself bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment.”5
The disagreement about whether to treat begging as conduct or speech is
best illustrated by two cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Young
v. New York City Transit Authority and Loper v. New York City Police
Department.6 In Young, a Second Circuit panel upheld a subway system ban

†

City attorney & municipal prosecutor, Walla Walla, Washington, 1996–present; J.D.,
Gonzaga University School of Law (1987); B.A., Whitman College (1984). The author thanks
Stephen “Steve” Hormel and Anthony “Tony” Shapiro.
1
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) [hereinafter
Schaumburg II].
2
Evans v. Sandy City, 944 F.3d 847, 852–53 (10th Cir. 2019); Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. at
644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that nothing in the Constitution should prevent a
community from insulating itself “against panhandlers, profiteers, and peddlers”).
3
See, e.g., Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874–78 (6th Cir. 2013) (summarizing
authorities).
4
E.g., Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 152–54 (2d Cir. 1990); Ulmer v.
Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
5
People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993).
6
Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
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on panhandling.7 The majority in Young doubted whether begging
constitutes the kind of expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.8 The court commented, “Common sense tells us that begging
is much more ‘conduct’ than it is ‘speech.’”9 The Young majority wrote that
conduct is constitutionally protected as speech only if it is intended to convey
a particularized message and there is a great likelihood that the message will
be understood by those who view it.10 The court went on to explain that
begging is not inseparably intertwined with any social or political message
and instead conveys only a generic desire to collect money which the majority
thought “falls far outside the scope of protected speech under the First
Amendment.”11
A dissenting judge in Young and a different Second Circuit panel in Loper
reached an opposite conclusion.12 Each saw little difference between the
organized charitable solicitation efforts that Schaumburg regarded as
protected speech and begging by individuals.13 The panel in Loper wrote,
“The former are communicating the needs of others while the latter are
communicating their personal needs. Both solicit the charity of others. The
distinction is not a significant one for First Amendment purposes.”14 Judge
Meskill additionally explained in his Young opinion that it is unrealistic to
try to distinguish between beggars who hold signs and those who do not,
because both send the same message.15 The Loper panel elaborated that, even
without particularized speech, “the presence of an unkempt and disheveled
person holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself
conveys a message of need for support and assistance.”16
The Supreme Court held in Reed v. Town of Gilbert that a speech
restriction will be considered content-based if it targets a particular type of
speech, even if the regulation has no improper censorial motive.17 Therefore,
7
Young, 903 F.2d at 150, 164 (explaining the regulatory ban and holding the regulation
does not violate the First Amendment).
8
Id. at 153.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 154.
12
Id. at 164–66 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Loper v. N.Y.C.
Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
13
Loper, 999 F.2d at 704; Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
14
Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
15
Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16
Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
17
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–71 (2015).
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Reed has become the focus for the evaluation of anti-panhandling laws
because content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid and
subject to strict scrutiny.18 However, the threshold question remains open at
the Supreme Court level: whether begging constitutes constitutionally
protected speech.19 In addition, the position of lower courts on that threshold
question may have become insulated from Supreme Court review by the
judicial reaction to Reed’s dominating impact on free speech analysis.20
This Article analyzes whether begging constitutes a constitutionally
protected communicative activity. It reviews Supreme Court cases regarding
the issue of conduct versus speech. It further reviews Supreme Court cases
addressing First Amendment protection afforded to charitable solicitations.
This Article also looks at how lower courts have applied those authorities,
and it proposes a framework for analyzing threshold First Amendment issues
surrounding panhandling.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Supreme Court Cases Re: Conduct vs. Speech

The Supreme Court commented in United States v. O’Brien that it could
not “accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”21 O’Brien did not, however, provide additional
guidance about how to distinguish unprotected conduct from speech.22 It
18

See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 576 U.S. 1048 (2015) (remanding Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014) for further consideration in light of Reed); Thayer v.
City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232–38 (D. Mass. 2015) (reviewing the City of
Worcester’s panhandling ordinances after remand and invalidating them in light of Reed);
see also Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 411–13 (7th Cir. 2015) (reconsidering
and revising an earlier decision by the Court of Appeals in Norton upholding the validity of a
panhandling ordinance and directing entry of an injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance in light of Reed); Norton v. City of Springfield, 324 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1001–02 (C.D.
Ill. 2018) (analyzing the impact of Reed); Mass. Coal. for the Homeless v. City of Fall River,
158 N.E.3d 856, 861–62 (Mass. 2020) (analyzing the impact of Reed).
19
Champion v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Ky. 2017). One commentator
suggests that the Supreme Court’s remand of a panhandling case, Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 576 U.S. 1048 (2015), with instructions to further consider the case in light of the
First Amendment content neutrality test announced by Reed, heavily implies that the Court
considers panhandling to be protected speech. Anthony D. Lauriello, Note, Panhandling
Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (2016).
20
Champion, 520 S.W.3d at 335 n.13.
21
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
22
See Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The Court
has, as yet, not established a test for determining at what point conduct becomes so
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instead assumed that the conduct at issue, draft card burning, contained a
communicative element and analyzed whether the governmental interests at
stake in regulating the non-speech element of that conduct were sufficiently
important to justify incidental limitations upon free speech.23 The Court held
that a sufficient justification exists to regulate a course of conduct comprised
of combined speech and non-speech elements if a regulation furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction
on free speech is no greater than is essential to further the governmental
interest.24
Spence v. Washington provided clarification upon the conduct versus
speech question.25 A college student in Spence affixed a peace symbol to a flag
and hung it in his window.26 He was thereafter arrested, charged, and
convicted under a flag misuse statute.27 In addressing a First Amendment
challenge against the conviction, the Supreme Court initially needed to
determine whether the student’s activity was sufficiently communicative to
warrant constitutional protection.28 The Court found that the student’s
display of an altered flag constituted symbolic speech because “[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.”29
The Supreme Court applied its Spence holding in another flag case in
Texas v. Johnson, explaining that “[i]n deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment
into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message
intertwined with expression that it becomes necessary to weigh the State’s interest in
proscribing conduct against the constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”
(citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376)).
23
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–82.
24
Id. at 376–77. Later cases describe O’Brien as establishing a four-part test: (1) is a
regulation within the constitutional power of the government to enact; (2) does the
regulation further an important or substantial government interest; (3) is the governmental
interest unrelated to suppression of free expression; and (4) is the restriction no greater than
is essential to further the government interest? E.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277,
296, 301 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567–72 (1991)
(plurality opinion).
25
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974).
26
Id. at 406.
27
Id. at 406–08.
28
Id. at 409.
29
Id. at 410–11.
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would be understood by those who viewed it.’”30 The Johnson Court noted
that the Court had, in prior cases, recognized the expressive nature of sit-in
demonstrations by African-Americans in “whites only” areas to protest
segregation, students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war,
picketing in a variety of settings, and donning military uniforms in
dramatizations critical of American involvement in Vietnam.31 Johnson also
provided a helpful example to differentiate expressive conduct from mere
action.32 It held that burning a flag in protest can qualify as expressive
conduct.33 However, dragging a flag through the mud due to fatigue might
not qualify as expressive conduct if a tired person is not doing so to express
an idea, even though the person knows that the conduct is likely to offend
others.34 The Court, therefore, made clear that context is important, and
actions cannot automatically be considered expressive conduct.35
Johnson also provided a checklist for the application of O’Brien.36 First,
determine whether an action constitutes expressive conduct.37 This is
ostensibly done using the two-part Spence test and depends upon context.38
Second, if conduct is expressive, determine whether a regulation “is related
to the suppression of free expression.”39 If unrelated, the O’Brien standard
applies.40 If related, O’Brien does not apply.41 This second determination is
made by looking at whether a regulation is directed at the communicative
nature of the conduct.42 If particular conduct is prohibited because of its
expressive elements, then O’Brien is inapplicable.43

30

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11).
Id.
32
See id. at 403 n.3.
33
Id. at 403, 406.
34
Id. at 403 n.3.
35
Id. at 405.
36
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
37
Id.
38
See id. at 404–06.
39
Id. at 403.
40
Id. at 403, 407. The O’Brien standard has been referred to as intermediate scrutiny. E.g.,
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010).
41
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. Johnson also indicates that the standard of scrutiny used to
evaluate a regulation is irrelevant if the governmental interest behind a regulation is not
implicated by the facts in a particular case, because such interest drops out of the picture in
that situation. Id. at 403–04.
42
Id. at 406.
43
See id. at 406–07.
31
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The focus of the O’Brien test has shifted over time. A plurality in City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. wrote, if a “government interest is related to the content of
the expression, . . . then the regulation falls outside the scope of the O’Brien
test and must be justified under a more demanding standard.”44 The effect of
this subtle change in terminology is evident in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, where the Court indicated that O’Brien applies to “contentneutral” regulations.45 By the time Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was
decided, the Supreme Court reasoned that “O’Brien does not provide the
applicable standard for reviewing a content-based regulation of
speech . . . .”46
The contours of O’Brien as an autonomous analytical tool have, therefore,
eroded over time. The Supreme Court commented in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence that the O’Brien test “in the last analysis is little, if
any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions.”47 The Court later clarified in Johnson that Clark meant only to
highlight that O’Brien is limited to situations where a governmental interest
is unconnected to expression.48 Nonetheless, it has occasionally appeared to
apply the O’Brien test interchangeably with the time, place, and manner
standard.49
44

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added).
45
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
46
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010).
47
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
48
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
49
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566–72 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Justice Kennedy commented in his concurrence in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee that their similarity leads to a “confluence of the two tests.” Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 704 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). It is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is conceivable that the Supreme
Court might reevaluate the erosion of O’Brien in light of its decision on content neutrality in
Reed. O’Brien allows regulation of conduct incidentally affecting speech if a regulation is
unrelated to suppression of expression. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
This criterion was similar to the pre-Reed content neutrality test which was primarily
concerned with whether a time, place, or manner restriction on speech was adopted for a
censorial purpose. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1992) (comparing O’Brien’s
prohibition against suppression of ideas to the content neutrality test in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), which focused upon “whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys”). The
content neutrality test after Reed is no longer directly analogous to the O’Brien factor
guarding against suppression of expression. Compare Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406–07
(explaining that the O’Brien test applies when the governmental interest behind a restriction
is unrelated to suppression of expression), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165–
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Supreme Court Cases Re: Charitable Solicitations

In Schaumburg, the Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance that
prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions door-todoor or in public rights-of-way unless the organization first submitted
satisfactory proof to the village that at least 75% of solicited proceeds would
directly benefit charitable purposes.50 The Court reviewed its prior cases and
ruled that they protected more than just the right to propagate a charity’s
views.51 The Court noted that the solicitation of funds did not transform
protected speech into mere commercial activity.52 It wrote that solicitation
and speech may be so intertwined that the collection of funds may be
regulated only if done in a manner that does not intrude on the right of free
speech.53 The Court explained:
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to
reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with
due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views
on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality
that without solicitation the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts are
necessarily more than solicitors for money. Furthermore,
because charitable solicitation does more than inform
private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned
with providing information about the characteristics and
costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our
cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.54
Schaumburg ultimately concluded that the question before the Court was not
whether charitable solicitations are protected by the First Amendment
because “[i]t is clear that they are.”55 Instead, the issue was whether the
ordinance regulated solicitation in a manner that did not unduly intrude on
68 (2015) (holding that a time, place, or manner regulation may be content based even
without a censorial motive).
50
Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. 620, 622–24, 628–39 (1980) (describing contents of ordinance
and invalidating ordinance).
51
Id. at 628–32.
52
Id. at 630.
53
Id. at 631.
54
Id. at 632.
55
Id. at 633.
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free speech rights.56 The Court, therefore, analyzed whether the 75%
charitable use requirement imposed by the ordinance served “a sufficiently
strong, subordinating interest.”57 It determined that the principal interest
asserted by the village was fraud prevention but found that less intrusive
measures could be used to prevent fraud than a ban based upon a charitable
expenditure restriction.58
Schaumburg introduced some uncertainty as to whether all solicitation
activity is protected.59 The Supreme Court repeated portions of the Court of
Appeals’ ruling, which indicated that a charitable use requirement might be
applied against charitable organizations whose solicitors were “mere
conduits for contributions.”60 The limitation could not be constitutionally
applied against organizations that necessarily combined “the solicitation of
financial support with the ‘functions of information dissemination,
discussion, and advocacy of public issues.’”61 Those organizations were,
however, distinguished from organizations that did not gather and
disseminate information but instead “provide[d] money or services for the
poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity” without advocating
positions on matters of public concern.62 It is important to note that the
Court of Appeals wrote only that a solicitation restriction might be valid
when applied to non-advocacy organizations.63 In addition, the Supreme
Court expressly endorsed only the ultimate holding of the Court of Appeals.64
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Village
of Schaumburg nonetheless left an impression that some sort of information
dissemination, discussion, or advocacy must intertwine with solicitation
activity for First Amendment protection to apply.65

56

Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 636.
58
Id. at 636–39.
59
See id. at 635–36.
60
Id. at 635 (quoting Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220, 226
(7th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Schaumburg I]).
61
Id. (quoting Schaumburg I, 590 F.2d at 225); Schaumburg I, 590 F.2d at 225 (referring
to such advocacy organizations as “‘public interest’ groups”).
62
Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. at 635.
63
Schaumburg I, 590 F.2d at 225–26.
64
See Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. at 636.
65
See Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[N]either
Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for the proposition that begging and panhandling are
protected speech . . . . Rather, these cases hold that there is a sufficient nexus between
solicitation by organized charities and a ‘variety of speech interests’ to invoke protection
under the First Amendment.”).
57
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The Supreme Court invalidated a Maryland statute in Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co. that was similar to the ordinance it found
unconstitutional in Schaumburg.66 The statute prohibited charitable
organizations from paying fundraising expenses greater than 25% of the
amount raised.67 The statute included a waiver provision that afforded some
flexibility absent from the ordinance considered in Schaumburg.68 The
Supreme Court held, however, that the provision was not sufficient to save
the restriction.69
The Court wrote in Munson that the solicitation activities restricted by the
Maryland statute “clearly encompass the types of speech determined in
Schaumburg to be entitled to First Amendment protection.”70 However, it
also indicated that charitable solicitations were entitled to protection because
they were intertwined with other speech.71 The Court wrote that the impact
of an expense restriction upon charities whose high costs were due to
information dissemination, discussion, and advocacy of public issues was a
primary concern.72 The Court commented, “[T]here no doubt are
organizations that have high fundraising costs not due to protected First
Amendment activity and that, therefore, should not be heard to
complain . . . [but] this statute cannot distinguish those organizations from
charities that have high costs due to protected First Amendment activities.”73
Therefore, it again left unclear the extent to which charitable solicitation
must intertwine with information dissemination, discussion, or advocacy to
merit First Amendment protection.74
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, the Supreme Court clarified
its prior discussions about solicitations intertwining with other speech.75 A
North Carolina statute was challenged in Riley that was directed against

66

Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950–52 (1984) (describing
statute); Id. at 959–70 (invalidating statute).
67
Munson, 467 U.S. at 950 n.2.
68
Id. at 952 (describing Maryland Circuit Court’s ruling regarding statutory flexibility);
Id. at 962 (explaining the statute).
69
Munson, 467 U.S. at 962–64.
70
Id. at 960 n.8.
71
Id. at 959–60.
72
Id. at 963–64.
73
Id. at 966.
74
See id. at 959–68; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
799 (1985) (implying that Schaumburg requires a “nexus between solicitation and the
communication of information and advocacy of causes”).
75
See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1988).
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professional fundraisers.76 It prohibited fundraisers from charging
unreasonable or excessive fees and provided various benchmarks by which
determinations of reasonableness would be made.77 The statutory scheme
included a provision that higher fees might be considered reasonable if a
“solicitation involved the dissemination of information or advocacy on
public issues directed by the charity.”78 The Supreme Court nonetheless
found that North Carolina could not dictate how much a charity could spend
on fundraising, because that would be a direct restriction on protected First
Amendment activity.79 It also reiterated that “the solicitation of charitable
contributions is protected speech.”80
The Riley Court wrote that its analysis in Schaumburg began by
categorizing the type of speech at issue because the Village of Schaumburg
had “argued that charitable solicitation [was] akin to a business proposition,
and therefore constitute[d] . . . commercial speech,”81 which is afforded less
robust constitutional protection than core-value speech.82 It explained that
the Schaumburg Court rejected the effort to classify charitable solicitation as
commercial speech because charitable solicitation involved a variety of
speech interests.83 The Riley Court clarified that this was because speech does
not retain “commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech.”84 Intertwining is, therefore, an issue only
insofar as the level of constitutional protection is concerned.85 If “component
parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined,” the less favorably
protected parts will not be separated from a more favorably protected whole
for less favorable treatment.86 Intertwining does not, however, appear to be a

76

See id. at 784–87.
Id. at 784–86.
78
Id. at 785.
79
Id. at 784, 788–89.
80
Id. at 789.
81
Riley, 487 U.S. at 787.
82
See id. at 795; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (explaining that
the First Amendment provides its highest protection to speech on matters of public concern
or public issues, because it is considered more than self-expression and is instead the essence
of self-government); cf. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000) (coining the
phrase “core-value speech” to describe speech that is given this special protection). See
generally Va. State Bd. Of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976).
83
Riley, 487 U.S. at 787–88.
84
Id. at 796.
85
See id. at 795–96.
86
Id. at 796.
77
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prerequisite for charitable solicitation to qualify as speech because even
commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection.87
A Supreme Court plurality reiterated in United States v. Kokinda that
“[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”88 Kokinda dealt primarily with how the forum where speech
occurs affects the standard of review and did not directly address the question
of intertwining.89 The Kokinda plurality did, however, recognize that
solicitation activity can impede the normal flow of traffic because those
solicited must listen, comprehend, and decide whether to contribute, and, if
they decide to do so, retrieve and exchange money.90 Kokinda held that such
interests may be sufficient in some situations to uphold a solicitation
restriction.91
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee upheld a prohibition
against soliciting in an airport terminal.92 The case again dealt primarily with
forum analysis, and the Court held that airport terminals are not considered
public fora.93 The majority opinion noted that the parties agreed the
87

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765–66 (1993) (holding that the First Amendment
protects personal solicitation for commercial purposes). See generally Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. at 758–70.
88
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (plurality opinion); see also Heffron
v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
89
See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725–33 (plurality opinion); Id. at 740–53 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
90
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733–35 (plurality opinion); accord Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683–84 (1992); see also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 664–65
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that crowd control and
safety can, in certain circumstances, constitute a substantial governmental interest).
91
The Kokinda plurality felt that the prevention of disruptions to the flow of traffic on
Postal Service premises provided a sufficient reason to justify a solicitation prohibition under
the reasonableness standard applicable to a nonpublic forum. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 734–35.
Justice Kennedy concurred, but he believed that such interests were significant and would
satisfy the higher standard applicable to time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 738–39
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
92
Lee, 505 U.S. at 685. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals later applied Lee when
concluding that an entryway to a subway escalator is a non-public forum and upholding a
ban against panhandling at a subway station or stop. McFarlin v. District of Columbia, 681
A.2d 440, 447–49 (D.C. 1996).
93
Lee, 505 U.S. at 679. Supreme Court cases generally recognize the following three types
of governmentally controlled areas: (1) traditional public forums—parks, streets, and
sidewalks—in which the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, but content-based restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny, and viewpoint-based
restrictions are prohibited; (2) designated public forums—public forums intentionally opened
by the government for public discourse—in which the same rules apply; and (3) nonpublic
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solicitation at issue in Lee was entitled to First Amendment protection, and
it did not further explore the issue.94 Having determined that an airport
terminal was not a public forum, the majority opinion held that the terminal’s
solicitation ban “need[ed] only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.”95
Justice Kennedy, along with three other Justices, believed that “airport
corridors and shopping areas outside of the passenger security zones” should
be considered public fora.96 Justice Kennedy, alone, also felt that a ban on
solicitation and receipt of funds within an airport terminal satisfied either the
standard for time, place, and manner restrictions on speech or the O’Brien
test for regulations directed at the non-speech element of expressive
conduct.97 He wrote that the two standards overlapped under the
circumstances of the case and acknowledged their similarity.98 Justice
Kennedy wrote that he would conclude a ban violated free speech rights if
directed solely at the communicative solicitation of funds.99 In his view,
however, the ban at issue in Lee was valid because it applied only to
immediate receipt of funds and was, therefore, “directed only at the physical
exchange of money, which is an element of conduct interwoven with
otherwise expressive solicitation.”100
Justice Kennedy wrote in Lee that in-person solicitations for immediate
payment of money create a well-recognized risk of fraud and duress.101 He
cited various instances in which the Supreme Court and federal agencies
identified problems and the potential for undue pressure when solicitors
target individuals and give them only limited time to reflect upon requests to
instantaneously provide funds.102 Justice Kennedy concluded that a ban
directed at such abusive practices, and not any particular message, was

forums—those forums which are not by tradition or designation open for public
communication—in which the government may reserve such fora for its intended purposes
as long as regulations on speech are reasonable and not imposed in an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose a speaker’s views. Minn. Voters All. v.
Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018). In addition, some public property may not be
considered a forum for speech at all. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
677–ؘ79 (1998).
94
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 677, 679.
95
Id. at 683.
96
Id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97
Id. at 703–04.
98
Id. at 704.
99
Id.
100
Lee, 505 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 705–06.
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content neutral and served a significant governmental interest.103 He further
wrote that a ban on solicitation of money for immediate receipt was narrowly
tailored because it applied only to that limited category of activity.104 Justice
Kennedy opined that only a particular manner of conduct associated with
solicitation was restricted.105 In his view, solicitors could continue making
requests for funds by other means. For example, solicitors were able to
distribute pre-addressed envelopes to those targeted, and alternative
channels of communication were, therefore, left open.106
C.

Lower Court Rulings Re: Begging

The California Court of Appeals wrote in Ulmer v. Municipal Court that
the First Amendment and its counterpart in the California State Constitution
“protect the freedom of individuals to speak, write, print, or disseminate
information or opinion,” but not “conduct bearing no necessary
relationship” with those activities.107 It reasoned that begging is not
constitutionally protected because it does “not necessarily involve the
communication of information or opinion.”108 The Appellate Division of the
Los Angeles County Superior Court later explained in People v. Zimmerman
that a prohibition against accosting people while begging prevented
“individuals from going about on the streets accosting others, i.e., walking up
to and approaching others, for handouts” but did not preclude someone from
passively receiving donations.109 Therefore, the court held that such a
prohibition pertained only to the conduct of beggars and not their message,
so, it concluded the prohibition did not impinge constitutionally protected
speech.110
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority, a panel of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged that passersby generally understand the
message conveyed by someone who begs, but it felt something more was
required for First Amendment protection to attach.111 The court indicated
the expression that occurs during begging does not involve an exchange of
ideas or spread of information sufficient to bring it within the First
103

Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
105
Id.
106
Lee, 505 U.S. at 707–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107
Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
108
Id. at 447.
109
People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993); see
also Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447–48.
110
Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489.
111
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990).
104
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Amendment.112 According to the majority in Young, the object of begging
and panhandling is the transfer of money. It wrote: “Speech simply is not
inherent to the act; it is not of the essence of the conduct.”113 This speech
versus conduct distinction was not, however, the basis for the majority ruling
in Young.114
The majority in Young principally held that the New York subway system
ban on panhandling satisfied the O’Brien test.115 The court wrote that the real
question to decide when determining whether the governmental interest
advanced by a regulation is not related to the suppression of free expression
under O’Brien is “whether the dangers relied on as justification for the
regulation arise at least in some measure from the alleged communicative
content of the conduct.”116 The majority in Young found that the ban at issue
protected users of the subway system from intimidating, threatening, and
inherently aggressive panhandling that the court felt was tantamount to an
assault in the close confines of the subway atmosphere.117 It also wondered
whether the message conveyed by someone begging in those circumstances
is not somehow “divested of any expressive element” for purposes of First
Amendment analysis.118 The majority concluded that begging in the subway
implicated legitimate public safety concerns because “[t]he conduct ‘disrupts’
and ‘startles’ passengers, thus creating the potential for a serious accident in
the fast-moving and crowded subway environment.”119 It, therefore, held that
the governmental interests behind the ban were unrelated to the suppression
of free speech, and “the exigencies created by begging and panhandling in the
subway warrant the conduct’s complete prohibition.”120
In Blair v. Shanahan, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held that Ulmer controls when applying the California
Constitution, but the court rejected both Ulmer and Young when it came to
the protection of begging under the U.S. Constitution.121 The court felt that
112

Id. at 154.
Id.
114
Id. (“[O]ur holding today does not ultimately rest on an ontological distinction
between speech and conduct . . . .”).
115
Id. at 157–61.
116
Id. at 158–59.
117
Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
118
Id. at 154.
119
Id. at 158.
120
Id. at 159; see also People v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429, 436–39 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994)
(upholding the constitutionality of the New York City Transit System ban on panhandling).
121
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1321–24 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 919 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
113
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Schaumburg, and the Supreme Court cases that followed, held that the First
Amendment clearly protected charitable solicitations, and that “[n]o
distinction of constitutional dimension exists between soliciting funds for
oneself and for charities.”122 It wrote that begging conveys information
regarding both a beggar’s plight and the way that society treats its poor.123
Additionally, the court opined that begging can change the way someone
views the poor because begging appeals to that person’s sense of compassion
and social justice.124 The District Court wrote in Blair that it is irrelevant for
First Amendment purposes whether every beggar conveys such a message or
enlightens those solicited, because many solicitors for organized charities
similarly fail to convey that message, and constitutional protection is not
limited to effective speech.125 In addition, it explained that those who beg do
not lose their free speech rights by keeping the funds they solicit, because the
value of speech does not depend upon the identity of its source.126
The court in Blair did not see any meaningful distinction between begging
and the organized charitable solicitation protected by Schaumburg.127 It
recognized that the messages conveyed by organized charities might more
effectively intertwine with particularized social commentary or political
speech, but commented that it would be “fair to say” most professional
fundraisers are not soliciting for those social or political reasons, but rather,
to collect money.128 Therefore, someone seeking personal financial help
should not be disqualified on the basis of speaker motivation.129 In addition,
a person in need should not be held to the same level of sophistication as a
professional fundraiser in communicating a message.130 The court concluded
that begging should have the same protection as organized charitable
solicitation because “First Amendment protection should not be limited to
the articulate.”131
Having concluded that begging constitutes protected speech, the court in
Blair found efforts to distinguish between the speech versus conduct aspects

122

Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1322–23.
124
Id. at 1323.
125
Id.
126
Id.; see also Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The fact that they
intend to ask for money does not mean that their speech is unprotected.”).
127
See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322–24.
128
Id. at 1323–24.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1324.
131
Id.
123
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of begging unavailing.132 It acknowledged that a properly drawn regulation
could prohibit intimidating, threatening, or coercive public encounters, but
begging cannot be automatically assumed to include such behavior.133 The
court found that a California statute targeted expression rather than conduct
by barring anyone from begging.134 It reasoned that a regulation truly
directed at intimidation, threats, or coercion would specifically target those
behaviors rather than begging in general.135 Consequently, a statute that
proscribed public encounters based upon whether or not a person was
begging was an unconstitutional infringement on speech rather than a
restriction on conduct.136 The court ruled that neither prevention of public
annoyance nor avoidance of intrusion on the public at large provided
sufficient justification for a content-based restriction on speech.137 It
explained: “The speech of the needy around us may well be subjectively felt
as an unwelcome intrusion by some, but the expressive freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution has never been costless.”138 Therefore, the Blair court
declared that a California anti-panhandling statute was unconstitutional.139
However, the appellate panel in People v. Zimmerman declined to follow
Blair.140 The panel wrote that it was bound by Ulmer and swayed by Young.141
The Zimmerman court focused on physical aspects of begging (i.e., accosting
others), and it held that such conduct is not sufficiently communicative to
merit First Amendment protection.142 It distinguished begging from
soliciting for charitable purposes based on a lack of intertwining.143 In the
court’s view:

132

Id. at 1324–26.
See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324–25.
134
Id. at 1317 n.1 (quoting statutory prohibition); Id. at 1324 (concluding that the statute
was a content-based restriction).
135
Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324–25.
136
Id. at 1325.
137
Id. at 1324.
138
Id. at 1325.
139
Blair, 775 F. Supp at 1325. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Blair to the
District Court to determine whether its declaratory ruling should be vacated due to a
settlement that procedurally barred appeal. Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1520–21 (9th
Cir. 1994). The District Court ultimately vacated its ruling that declared the California antipanhandling statute facially unconstitutional. Blair v. Shanahan, 919 F. Supp. 1361, 1364–67
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
140
See People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 488 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993).
141
Id. at 488–489.
142
Id. at 489.
143
Id. at 490–91.
133
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[T]he nexus between charitable solicitations and the
communication of information and advocacy of causes
implicates interests protected by the First Amendment. On
the other hand, “with or without words, the object of
begging . . . is the transfer of money. Speech simply is not
inherent to the act; it is not of the essence of the conduct.”144
The Second Circuit panel in Loper v. New York City Police Department,
invalidated a citywide ban against loitering for the purpose of begging.145 The
panel explained that the court’s earlier subway system ruling in Young could
not be applied to traditional public forums like sidewalks, which have
historically been open for expressive activity.146 The court acknowledged that
begging does not always involve the expression of particularized social or
political messages, but it saw little difference between solicitation by
organized charities and those who beg out of personal need.147 It wrote,
“Certainly, a member of a charitable, religious or other organization who
seeks alms for the organization and is also, as a member, a beneficiary of those
alms should be treated no differently from one who begs for his or her own
account.”148 The Loper court recognized the Supreme Court’s references to
intertwining speech-types in Schaumburg, but it did not find the distinctions
to have constitutional significance.149 Accordingly, the Loper court held that
begging could not be prohibited in a public forum absent a compelling
governmental interest.150
The Loper court additionally examined the O’Brien test.151 It wrote that a
total prohibition against begging in public rights-of-way would not satisfy
the test because such a ban would give rise to much more than just an
incidental limitation on free expression.152 The Loper court listed many New
144
Id. at 490 (quoting Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted)).
145
See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701, 706 (2d Cir. 1993).
146
Id. at 702–04.
147
Id. at 704–05.
148
Id. at 705.
149
Id. at 704.
150
Id. at 704–05.
151
Loper, 999 F.2d at 702, 705.
152
Id. at 705; cf. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
begging cannot be considered a nuisance per se and a total ban on begging is
unconstitutional). See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[W]hen
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” (emphasis added)).
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York statutes that separately address aggressive, obstructive, and fraudulent
behaviors, and opined that the statutes were adequate for those types of
concerns in the context of begging.153 Furthermore, the court recognized a
distinction between a general ban on begging and a restriction applicable
only to aggressive begging, which the court felt targeted conduct beyond
speech, expression, and communication.154 The court wrote that a total
prohibition could not, however, “be characterized as a merely incidental
limitation, because it serves to silence both speech and expressive conduct on
the basis of the message.”155
An overwhelming majority of appellate courts have held that begging is
protected by the First Amendment.156 Reported decisions from trial courts
say the same.157 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed many of these
authorities in Speet v. Schuette.158 It noted that the Supreme Court “has
held―repeatedly―that the First Amendment protects charitable

153

Loper, 999 F.2d at 701–02.
Id. at 706.
155
Id. at 705. See generally O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 388–89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (writing
separately to make explicit his understanding that O’Brien would not foreclose consideration
of “First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an ‘incidental’ restriction upon
expression, imposed by a regulation which furthers an ‘important or substantial’
governmental interest and satisfies the Court’s other criteria, in practice has the effect of
entirely preventing a ‘speaker’ from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not
otherwise lawfully communicate”).
156
McCraw v. City of Okla. City, 973 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2020); Rodgers v. Bryant,
942 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2019); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015);
Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. Charlottesville, 708 F.3d
549, 553 (4th Cir. 2013); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903–05 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999); Loper, 999 F.2d at 704–05; State
v. Boehler, 262 P.3d 637, 641 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); C.C.B., 458 So.2d at 50; Champion v.
Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Ky. 2017); Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d
184, 188 (Mass. 1997); City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016). Contra
Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Zimmerman, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489–90 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993); cf. Young v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 152–54 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining why the panel majority believed that
begging is not constitutionally protected, but not ultimately resting its decision on those
grounds).
157
Brown v. Gov’t of D.C., 390 F. Supp.3d 114, 124 (D.D.C. 2019); Blitch v. City of Slidell,
260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 663–64 (E.D. La. 2017); Petrello v. City of Manchester, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 144793, at *52 (D.N.H. Sept. 7, 2017); McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp.3d
177, 183–84 (D. Mass. 2015); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1256–
57 (D. Colo. 2015); ACLU of Idaho v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (D. Idaho
2014); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322–24 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 919 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1996); People v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434–35 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).
158
Speet, 726 F.3d at 874–76.
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solicitations performed by organizations.”159 The Speet court further
explained that most lower courts cannot see how begging by individuals can
be treated differently than soliciting by charitable organizations.160 It stated
that “begging is indistinguishable from charitable solicitation for First
Amendment purposes. To hold otherwise would mean that an individual’s
plight is worthy of less protection in the eyes of the law than the interests
addressed by an organized group.”161
The court in Speet rejected Justice Kennedy’s assertion in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee that the part of begging where money
actually changes hands can be separated from a communicative request for
funds.162 In so doing, the Speet court took a different approach to the question
of intertwining.163 While some opinions look at whether a solicitation
sufficiently intertwines with other types of speech to qualify for
constitutional protection, the Speet court held this type of intertwining may
be presumed “whether or not any speech incident to the solicitation actually
takes place,” because all types of charitable solicitation are indistinguishable
and “characteristically intertwined” with protected speech.164 The Speet court
expanded upon the concept of intertwining and also concluded that the
physical exchange of money during begging cannot be isolated, because “it is
‘intertwined’ with speech that the First Amendment protects.”165
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Gresham v. Peterson
that the Supreme Court in Schaumburg focused upon how the flow of social,
economic, political, and cultural information would be impeded if charitable

159

Id. at 874.
See id. at 874–76.
161
Id. at 877 (quoting Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)); see also Blitch, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 664 (“[T]he availability of an
organizational outlet for speech should not shield individual restrictions on speech from
First Amendment scrutiny.”); Benefit, 679 N.E.2d at 188.
162
Speet, 726 F.3d at 876. See generally Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 704–05 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163
See Speet, 726 F.3d at 876.
164
See id. at 877 (emphasis added) (reviewing Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d
146, 164–65 (2d Cir.1990) (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). But see
People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 490–91 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993)
(distinguishing begging from charitable solicitation on the basis that begging is not
characteristically intertwined with core value speech).
165
Speet, 726 F.3d at 876; see also Petrello v. City of Manchester, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144793, at *52 (D.N.H. Sept. 7, 2017) (“[T]he physical exchange of money is an integral
component and the ultimate purpose of panhandling, which is expressive activity protected
by the First Amendment.”).
160
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solicitations were not constitutionally protected.166 It did not, however, feel
that this provided a basis by which to distinguish solicitations by charities
from begging by individuals.167 The court explained, “Beggars at times may
communicate important political or social messages in their appeals for
money, explaining their conditions related to veteran status, homelessness,
unemployment, and disability, to name a few. Like the organized charities,
their messages cannot always be easily separated from their need for
money.”168 The Gresham court concluded that the analysis in Schaumburg
suggested little reason to distinguish between beggars and charities and,
therefore, found the same framework that limits governmental regulation of
solicitations by charitable organizations applies to panhandling.169
III. PROPOSAL
“[B]egging is at least ‘a form of speech.’”170 It generally occurs when a
“person seeking assistance either asks for money or expresses need through
some other clear form of communication such as a sign, a donation cup, or
an outstretched hand.”171 When someone uses words to make a plea, any
distinction between speech and conduct seems irrelevant.172 A person speaks
and conveys a particularized message when asking if a passerby can spare
some change. “Similarly, a beggar who holds a sign saying ‘Help the
Homeless’ or ‘I am hungry’ is engaged in First Amendment activity.”173 A
request may use words that are less direct, but “[p]lainly, a sign reading
‘Sober,’ or ‘Two children,’ conveys a message about who is deserving of
charitable support, just as a sign reading ‘God bless,’ expresses a religious

166
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing Schaumburg II,
444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
167
Id. at 903–05.
168
Id. at 904.
169
Id. at 904–05; see also Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“We see little difference between those who solicit for organized charities and those who
solicit for themselves in regard to the message conveyed.”); Champion v. Commonwealth,
520 S.W.3d 331, 334–35 (Ky. 2017).
170
Loper, 999 F.2d at 704 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 677 (1992)).
171
Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Mass. 1997).
172
Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (holding that someone could not be
punished for offensive conduct by wearing a jacket bearing the words “F[ ] the Draft,”
because “[t]he only ‘conduct’ which the State sought to punish is the fact of
communication”).
173
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 165 (2d Cir.1990) (Meskill, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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message.”174 As a practical matter, an incomprehensible appeal for funds
would not implicate a panhandling restriction because enforcement action is
typically undertaken only when a message is clear enough to indicate that a
violation has occurred. In other words, a message is not characterized as
panhandling unless that is how it is understood by those who hear or see it.
Efforts to disqualify spoken or written solicitations as speech on the basis of
message quality, therefore, appear misplaced. Constitutional protection
should not be limited to those who speak or write eloquently.175
With respect to the threshold question of whether speech has occurred,
the distinction between speaking versus acting is relevant, but only in
determining if wordless conduct is sufficiently expressive to bring the First
Amendment into play.176 Under the two-part test adopted by Spence v.
Washington: (1) conduct must be intended to convey a particularized
message, and (2) there must be a great likelihood that those who witnessed
the conduct understood the message.177 The bar is not high, and the sight of
someone in an impoverished condition holding out a cup or hand in hopes
of charity should suffice.178 Begging in silence is another self-evident situation
when panhandling restrictions are enforced. The wordless conduct of a
person cited for panhandling obviously conveyed an effective message from
the viewpoint of the authority that issued the citation.
However, the necessity of intertwining is an issue. It pertains to the level
of constitutional protection provided rather than the threshold question of
whether speech has occurred.179 The Supreme Court explained in Snyder v.
Phelps that speech on matters of public concern receives special protection
because the First Amendment expresses a principle that uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open debate on public affairs is essential to self-government.180 The
law, therefore, affords greater protection to speech related to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community and speech on matters
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McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2015).
See Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 919 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
178
See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); Benefit v. City of
Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Mass. 1997).
179
See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 787–89, 795–96 (1988)
(explaining that intertwining determines whether soliciting should be treated as commercial
speech or as better-protected core-value speech); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903–04
(7th Cir. 2000).
180
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011).
175
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having news interest to the public.181 The Court also indicated in Snyder that
when speech on “matters of purely private significance are at issue, First
Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”182 It recognized that “the
boundaries of the public concern test are not well-defined.”183 The content,
form, and context of speech must be examined to decide whether speech is
of public or private concern, and no single factor is determinative.184 The
Court wrote, “it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech,
including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”185
The Supreme Court of Illinois has interpreted Snyder as allowing use of an
intermediate level of scrutiny when reviewing regulations upon private
matter speech.186 Thus, private matter speech arguably may receive
diminished constitutional protection in a manner similar to traditionally less
favored commercial speech.187 It is doubtful, however, that Snyder would ever
provide grounds to completely strip private matter speech of any
constitutional protection.188
The courts in Young, Ulmer, and Zimmerman all characterized their
doubts about the adequacy of the message conveyed by beggars as a matter
of conduct versus speech.189 However, the tenor of the discussion in each was
that begging did not, in their collective judgments, involve speech on issues
of public concern and was, therefore, not entitled to full constitutional
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Id. at 453.
Id. at 452; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758–61 (1985); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983).
183
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452.
184
Id. at 453–54.
185
Id. at 454.
186
People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 458–59 (Ill. 2019) (upholding an Illinois statute
criminalizing revenge porn).
187
Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) (describing the analysis used to evaluate restrictions on commercial speech), with
Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 459 (describing the intermediate scrutiny test used by the court to
evaluate a restriction on private matter speech).
188
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”).
189
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that “begging
is much more ‘conduct’ than it is ‘speech’”); Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (“Regulation of conduct bearing no necessary relationship to the freedom to
speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion does not abridge the guarantees of
the First Amendment.”); People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that the anti-begging statute at issue “proscribes certain conduct by
an individual who begs or solicits alms, rather than the message he seeks to convey”).
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protection.190 Other courts have reached an opposite conclusion.191
Consequently, intertwining might be an important post-Snyder topic when
considering the extent to which begging is protected by the First
Amendment.192
In common experience, begging takes many forms. Everyone has probably
at some point seen a needy person holding a sign saying, “Homeless Veteran,
Please Help” or something similar. Everyone likewise has undoubtedly, and
possibly to their annoyance, encountered many persons who have asked
nothing more than: “Can you spare some change?” Depending upon the
number of times a person experiences each situation, it is understandable
why people’s opinions about begging differ. Those who frequently encounter
others who ask for help while making known the reasons for their plight
likely perceive a broader social message. Those who daily receive only
unexplained requests for change might be more inclined to view begging
differently. Thus, reasonable minds may differ about whether begging
constitutes speech of public or private concern under a test that evaluates all
the circumstances surrounding it, including what, where, and how
something was said.193
Similarly, judicial opinions vastly differ. The majority in Young wrote that
“[t]he only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of begging
is that beggars want to exact money from those whom they accost.”194 In
contrast, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized in
Benefit v. City of Cambridge: “Many times a beggar’s solicitations will be
accompanied . . . by communications that convey social or political
messages.”195 The court in Loper wrote that begging “usually involves” some
190
See Young, 903 F.2d at 153 (opining that people do not beg to “convey any social or
political message” and instead just “beg to collect money”); Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447
(asserting that “[b]egging and soliciting for alms do not necessarily involve the
communication of information or opinion; therefore, approaching individuals for that
purpose is not protected by the First Amendment”); Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490
(distinguishing begging from charitable solicitations on the basis that “the nexus between
charitable solicitations and the communication of information and advocacy of causes
implicates interests protected by the First Amendment”).
191
E.g., Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322–23 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Begging gives
the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas on, among other things, the way
our society treats its poor and disenfranchised.”), vacated, 919 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
192
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that someone
could argue panhandling is commercial speech, but that argument seems more farfetched).
193
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453–54 (2011).
194
Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
195
Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Mass. 1997).
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communication containing a particularized social or political message
because it “frequently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for food,
shelter, clothing, medical care or transportation.”196 The extent to which the
First Amendment protects begging may therefore come down to the issue of
intertwining.
The lineage of the Supreme Court’s charitable solicitation cases is
instructive and may be determinative as to how much intertwining is actually
required. The Court began in Schaumburg by suggesting that charities that
do not disseminate, discuss, or advocate positions on matters of public
concern while soliciting might not be protected to the same extent as those
who do.197 In succeeding cases, the Court addressed governmental efforts to
utilize this apparent loophole. In Munson, the Court invalidated a statute that
tried to exploit the opening left by Schaumburg, but it again indicated that a
charity whose high fundraising costs were not attributable to intertwined
advocacy efforts might not have First Amendment grounds to complain
about solicitation restrictions.198 However, the Court in Riley seemingly put
to rest any misunderstanding regarding the extent to which actual
intertwining is required.199 The statute at issue in Riley was specifically
directed at the fees of professional fundraisers and, in particular, those whose
activities did not include public issue advocacy on behalf of the charities for
whom they solicited.200 In the end, any distinction between solicitors who do
advocate and those who do not advocate did not matter.201 The Court wrote,
“Regulation of a solicitation ‘must be undertaken with due regard for the
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech . . . and for the reality that without solicitation the
flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.’”202
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Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1980).
198
Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966 (1984).
199
See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988).
200
See id. at 784–86 (describing statute limiting fundraiser fees which provided a case-bycase exception for those who could show that their solicitation activities included advocacy).
201
See id. at 794 (rejecting arguments that the structure of the statute distinguished it
from the rulings in Schaumburg and Munson).
202
Id. at 796 (emphasis added) (quoting Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. at 632). As Second
Circuit Judge Meskill explained:
197

Notably, the Court [in Village of Schaumburg] did not suggest that
charitable solicitation is protected expression because it is always
accompanied by speech on social issues. If that were the test, then it is
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It could be reasonably argued that organized solicitation is different than
begging because it is presumed that matters of public concern always
underlie and thereby intertwine with charitable fundraising activities
whether or not expressly communicated.203 The same presumption cannot be
indulged with respect to individuals who beg solely for private need.204
However, to rephrase the position taken by the Blair court as a question, if all
organized charitable solicitation is fully protected because it sometimes
intertwines with core-value speech, why would the same not apply to
begging?205 Other courts have made similar observations. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana wrote in Blitch v. City of
Slidell that it seems backward that organizational speech would be more
protected than individual speech.206 In Benefit, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts elaborated:
Indeed, it would be illogical to restrict the right of the
individual beggar to seek assistance for himself while
protecting the right of a charitable organization to solicit
funds on his behalf. Such a conclusion would require citizens
to organize in order to avail themselves of free speech
guarantees, a requirement that contradicts the policies
underlying the First Amendment.207

doubtful that any organized charity soliciting contributions in the New
York subway would be engaged in protected expression.
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 165 (2d Cir. 1990) (Meskill, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
203
See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that
begging does not always involve the transmission of particularized social or political
messages, but the concept that canvassers for charities are more than mere solicitors is
inherent in all the charitable solicitation cases).
204
See Young, 903 F.2d at 155 (opining that, unlike charitable solicitations, begging lacks
a nexus with the communication of information and advocacy); see also People v.
Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 490–91 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993).
205
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322–23 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Begging can
promote the very speech values that entitle charitable appeals to constitutional
protection . . . . That many beggars fail to so inform or affect their listeners is irrelevant.
Many charitable solicitors fail to educate, enlighten, or persuade their listeners.”), vacated,
919 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
206
Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656, 664 (E.D. La. 2017).
207
Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Mass. 1997); see also Speet v.
Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 877 (6th Cir. 2013); Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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A central teaching of Schaumburg and its progeny is that less favored
speech is protected to the same degree as core-value speech when they are
inextricably intertwined.208 Begging sometimes, but not always, includes
readily identifiable core-value speech.209 So, even if begging is not considered
“means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth,”210 the
real question is presumably whether enough begging is intertwined with
core-value speech for the Supreme Court to generally characterize begging as
speech on matters of public concern. Most lower courts conclude that it is.211
This article therefore proposes the following framework for analyzing First
Amendment issues related to panhandling: (1) Begging is speech. If the
wordless conduct of a person in need is inadequate to convey an appeal for
support and assistance, it is not protected speech, but it then also cannot be
considered begging because an uncertain message is simply unclear for all
purposes; (2) Begging is entitled to constitutional protection, regardless of
whether it is considered speech on a matter of public concern or private
matter speech, because characterization of the type of speech determines only
the level of protection that is provided; and (3) Even if begging is considered
private matter speech when standing alone, it should be given the greater
protection if it is sufficiently intertwined with core-value speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
A minority of judicial opinions assert that begging should be treated as
conduct rather than speech.212 Such opinions conclude that begging is not
inseparably intertwined with a particularized message worthy of First
Amendment protection.213 Prohibitions against panhandling, therefore, do
208
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). See generally
Schaumburg II, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
209
Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (“While we indicated in
Young that begging does not always involve the transmission of a particularized social or
political message it seems certain that it usually involves some communication of that
nature.” (citation omitted)); see also Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Beggars at times may communicate important political or social messages . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Benefit, 679 N.E.2d at 188 (“Many times a beggar’s solicitations . . . convey social or
political messages.” (emphasis added)).
210
Young, 903 F.2d at 154 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
211
See, e.g., Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 875–78 (6th Cir. 2013) (reviewing
authorities).
212
See Young, 903 F.2d at 153–54; Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976); People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
1993).
213
E.g., Young, 903 F.2d at 153–54.
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not impinge on free speech but only the taking of money.214 Those in need
may still speak to others about their plight as long as they do not also
immediately hit them up for cash.215 They might also passively accept
donations as long as they do not physically accost others.216 In the view of
those opinions, anti-begging laws merely protect “citizens from unwanted
exposure to certain intrusive and unpleasant methods of expression which
may properly be deemed a public nuisance.”217
In response to the conduct vs. speech distinction, Judge Meskill of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals opined that such a worldview is unrealistic.
He wrote, “To suggest that these individuals, who are obviously struggling to
survive, are free to engage in First Amendment activity in their spare time
ignores the harsh reality of the life of the urban poor.”218 A majority of lower
courts conclude that begging intertwines with messages of social importance
in the same manner as organized charitable solicitations and is therefore fully
protected speech for purposes of the First Amendment.219 The majority
recognizes that begging may entail some annoyance to those solicited but
explain that “[p]rotecting citizens from mere annoyance is not a sufficient
compelling reason to absolutely deprive one of a first amendment right.”220
They further explain that truly harmful fraud, intimidation, coercion, and
assaultive conduct may be addressed by laws targeted specifically at those
behaviors.221 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals commented in Gresham
v. Peterson, “While some communities might wish all solicitors, beggars and
advocates of various causes be vanished from the streets, the First
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Id. at 154.
Id.; cf. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 707–08 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (opining that restrictions against charities asking for immediate
receipt of funds do not unconstitutionally impair free speech because solicitors can still
provide envelopes and ask those solicited to mail contributions).
216
See Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447–48.
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Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491; see also Young, 903 F.2d at 156 (“While
organized charities serve community interests by enhancing communication and
disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to
nothing less than a menace to the common good.”).
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Young, 903 F.2d at 166 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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See, e.g., Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 875–78 (6th Cir. 2013) (reviewing cases).
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Cambridge, 679 N.E.2d 184, 188 n.4 (Mass. 1997); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615
(1971).
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E.g., Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701–02, 705 (2d Cir. 1993); Blair v.
Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 919 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
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Amendment guarantees their right to be there, deliver their pitch and ask for
support.”222
The Supreme Court held in Snyder v. Phelps that speech pertaining purely
to matters of private significance may receive less constitutional protection
than speech related to matters of public concern.223 It may be reasonably
argued that begging by an individual communicates private need rather than
commentary upon political or social issues.224 However, as a justice on the
Washington State Supreme Court wrote, it may also be reasonably argued
that “[e]ven the statement ‘I am hungry’ communicates a fact of social
existence of some relevance to public discourse.”225 The extent to which the
First Amendment protects begging may therefore depend upon whether
begging is seen as something that characteristically intertwines with corevalue speech.226
The Supreme Court held in Schaumburg that charitable solicitation by
organized charities is fully protected by the First Amendment.227 It reasoned
that charitable fundraising activities are characteristically intertwined with
advocacy and other speech on matters of public concern that would cease
without such solicitations.228 Most lower courts see no distinction of
constitutional significance between organized charitable solicitations and
begging.229 The court in Blair v. Shanahan explained that “First Amendment
protection depends on the type of speech, and not on the organization
promoting the message. ‘The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend on the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.’”230 Those
courts, therefore, hold that begging should receive the same level of
protection as charitable solicitation.231 The court in People v. Schrader bluntly
222
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224
See Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153–54 (2d Cir. 1990); Ulmer v.
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explained why, in its opinion, those who beg on their own behalf should not
be treated differently for First Amendment purposes than those who solicit
on behalf of organized charities: “No rational distinction can be made
between the message involved, whether the person standing on the corner
says ‘Help me, I’m homeless’ or ‘Help the homeless.’”232
It remains an open question whether begging is communicative activity
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.233 The reality
of the situation faced by those who, for whatever reason, rely on begging to
survive should not, however, get lost in the discussion. As the court in
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell reminds: “Panhandling is not merely a minor,
instrumental act of expression. . . . [A]t stake is ‘the right to engage fellow
human beings with the hope of receiving aid and compassion.’”234
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